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SWIMMING IN A SEA OF LAW: REFLECTIONS ON WATER BORDERS, 
IRISH (-BRITISH)-EURO RELATIONS AND OPTING-OUT AND 
OPTING-IN AFTER THE TREATY OF LISBON 
ELAINE FAHEY*
1. Introduction
The successful second referendum on the Treaty of Lisbon (Lisbon II)1 in 
Ireland in October 2009 finally brought the Irish Government some respite 
from European Union affairs. The process of the first failed referendum in 
2008 (Lisbon I) and then the extensive political campaign to ratify the Treaty 
a second time around brought with it a tremendous period of reflection, not 
merely for the Irish State but also for institutional actors, scholars and civil 
society alike. Many recommendations were made in this period by this broad 
church to reform Irish “European affairs,” by re-evaluating fundamental and 
broad-ranging themes such as the government referendum spending rules, 
referendum broadcasting rules, and the role of the Oireachtas (Irish Parliament) 
in European Union affairs generally.2 Thus, the prolonged and tense period of 
crisis and reflection over a two-year period brought with it an institutionalized 
“think-in” as to European Union membership incomparable to any previous 
time in Irish history. Yet despite the long and extensive period of reflection 
between Lisbon I and Lisbon II, what is notable is that the Irish relationship 
* Max Weber Fellow, European University Institute, Florence, Italy. Elaine.fahey@eui.eu. 
Thanks to Bruno de Witte, John Bruton, Bernard Ryan, participants at the conference “After the 
Stockholm Programme: An Area of Freedom, Security and Justice in the European Union” (Uni-
versity of Salford, Greater Manchester, 28–29 June 2010), participants at the workshop “The 
Politics of European Law” (Trinity College Dublin, 12 March 2010) and the anonymous review-
ers for their helpful comments and suggestions. All errors and omissions are solely those of the 
author.
1. O.J. 2007, C 306/1, which entered into force on 1 Dec. 2009.
 2. Sub-Committee on Ireland’s Future in the EU, Ireland’s Future in the European Union: 
Challenges, Issues and Options (Houses of the Oireachtas, 2008); Barrett, “Building a Swiss 
Chalet in an Irish legal landscape? Referendums on European Union treaties in Ireland & the 
impact of Supreme Court jurisprudence”, 5 EuConst (2009), 32; Kingston, “Ireland’s options 
after the Lisbon Referendum: Strategies, implications and competing visions of Europe”, 34 EL 
Rev. (2009), 467; Hogan, “The Lisbon Treaty and the Irish Referendum”, 15 EPL (2009), 163; 
Broadcasting Commission of Ireland, Guidelines in respect of coverage of the referendum on the 
Treaty of Lisbon and related constitutional amendments (2009) see www.bci.ie.
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with the European Union’s former Third Pillar, its future participation in the 
Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, the Irish Schengen Protocol arrange-
ments and Irish-British relations in a European Union context did not receive 
anything that could be called substantive coverage in this period.
 The Irish Government commissioned research on the negative public vote 
on Lisbon I, and from the findings distinct trends were discernable concern-
ing class and gender in voting patterns. Ultimately, many respondents pointed 
to an information deficit.3 
 The militarization of the European Union was a particular matter of con-
cern to voters, and the issue was included in the Guarantees provided in 2009 
by the Heads of State or Government of the European Union to assist the Irish 
Government in obtaining a successful result in the second referendum.4 Impor-
tantly, the relationship between public opinion and Irish participation in Jus-
tice and Home Affairs, the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, and its 
opt-out from the Schengen Area did not – according to the research – provoke 
the negative referendum result. A fragile outsider stance of “opt-out/opt-in” 
post-Lisbon now characterizes the Irish relationship with the entire Area of 
Freedom, Security and Justice, in the form of Protocols and Declarations as 
contained in the Treaty of Lisbon. The background to this situation, in tandem 
with the Treaty of Lisbon revisions to the Schengen Protocol and the general 
context of “Irish(-British)-Euro relations” and European Union law, forms the 
subject of analysis here. 
 “British-Irish” relations, the usual alphabetical and legal5 formula employed 
to consider matters of policy between the two States, is intentionally inverted 
here with a view to critically tracing Irish law and policy on specific European 
Union issues after the Treaty of Lisbon. The elision of the two States in the 
title of this article and the interconnecting symbol separated by brackets are 
employed here as a metaphor for the complexities associated with this inter-
connection. Thus, the focus of this paper is on Irish-British relations and their 
3. Post-Lisbon Treaty Research Findings (Millward Brown IMS, Dublin, 2008), www.
imsl.ie/ (last visited 27 Nov. 2009), conducted on 2,101 adults.
4. See Hogan, op. cit. supra note 2, 163; and see Presidency Conclusions of the Brussels 
European Council, 18–19 June 2009 (11225/2/09, Rev. 2, 10 July 2009), discussed below in sec-
tion 8.
5. See, for example, the Belfast Agreement, the peace agreement concluded on Good Friday 
in 1998 heralding a new era of peace in Northern Ireland, which contained two elements, one of 
which is entitled the British-Irish Agreement, an international agreement between the Irish and 
British States, implemented by the North-South Ministerial Council, a British-Irish Intergovern-
mental conference and the British-Irish Council. The Belfast Agreement is also known as the 
Good Friday Agreement and the British-Irish Agreement. See also the Irish legislation passed to 
give effect to the Belfast Agreement, the British-Irish Agreement Acts 1999 and 2002. Thus the 
term “British-Irish relations” is deeply ingrained in this usual linguistic sense as a matter of law 
and politics. 
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impact on Irish policies in a European context and the resulting legal  provisions, 
namely the Common Travel Area between the States and the “special arrange-
ments” provided for in the the Schengen Protocol and the special Protocols on 
Ireland and the UK of the Treaty of Amsterdam. 
 It is suggested here that the far-reaching Irish policy opt-out/opt-ins obtained 
in the Treaty of Lisbon do not amount to a systematic “better bargain” obtained 
as regards European Union affairs, but rather are the strange and unacknowl-
edged outcome of Irish-British relations to date. Water borders and the Com-
mon Travel Area are unduly significant in accounts of “Irish-(British)-Euro” 
relations up to now, and a more complex set of variables provides an explana-
tion of this phenomenon. The increased flexibility accorded to Ireland and the 
UK in the Treaty of Lisbon seems almost disproportionate to its effectiveness 
as a matter of European Union constitutional law, where variable geometry 
has largely been a failure in legal terms. The contention of the present author 
is that the assumed similarities of the positions in law and policy of the two 
States in European matters fails to take into account constitutional peculiari-
ties relevant to the Irish State, and that major issues as a matter of domestic 
law and not European law surround the future successful operation of the Pro-
tocols, Declarations and Guarantees recently obtained by Ireland. It is also 
argued here that the operation of these Protocols, Declarations and Guarantees 
is intrinsically dependent on the future decisions of the British Government as 
to the Common Travel Area, the Treaty of Lisbon Transitional Provisions, and 
its remaining outside the Schengen Area. 
 The article is organized as follows: Irish-British relations as to law, policy 
and litigation are firstly assessed here, followed by an outline of the operation 
of the Common Travel Area between Ireland and the UK. The evolution of the 
special arrangements for Ireland and the UK under, in particular, the Schen-
gen Protocol is then traced. The recent decisions of the Court of Justice on this 
Protocol are considered, followed by an analysis of the Protocols, Declara-
tions and Guarantees obtained by Ireland in order to ratify the Treaty of Lis-
bon, as well as a revised Schengen Protocol and an opt-out/opt-in as to the 
Area of Freedom, Security and Justice. Finally, the constitutional changes made 
to Bunreacht na héireann (t he Irish Constitution) so as to allow the Treaty of 
Lisbon to take effect in domestic law are assessed, in light of the Protocols, 
Declarations and Guarantees obtained.
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2. Irish-British relations and their impact on Irish policies to the 
European Union
2.1. Background 
An attempt is made here firstly to consider briefly the similarities and differ-
ences between Irish and British relations with the European Union, from the 
points of view of law, policy and litigation.
 The outward indicators of “Irish-British” relations at European Union level 
as a matter of law and policy point to an Irish entity riding on the coattails of 
the British Government.6 The reasons commonly asserted for the close rela-
tions in law and politics in European Union affairs typically refer to the Com-
mon Travel Area between Ireland and the UK and the common law tradition 
shared by the two States.7 However, the relationship of the UK with the Euro-
pean Union is often depicted as awkward or troubled, earning itself a reputa-
tion as “the European Union’s trickiest customer.”8 This label is not however 
used by commentators referring to the Irish State when describing its Euro-
pean Union credentials. The unsuccessful Nice I and Lisbon I referenda aside, 
the Irish electorate has been broadly in favour of the European Union accord-
ing to decades of Eurobarometer polls, unlike the British electorate.9 As to pol-
icy, similar to the UK and throughout many decades of European Union 
membership since accession, Irish concerns expressed in the lead-in to the 
adoption of the Constitutional Treaty (and to a lesser extent the Treaty of Lis-
bon, discussed here) related to tax harmonization, foreign policy and some 
aspects of Justice and Home Affairs, and they continue now to be areas of sen-
sitivity, with Ireland maintaining a need for unanimity, although this position 
6. See Fitzgerald, “Irish support for Blair was damaging to our interests”, (31 Oct. 2009) 
Irish Times. 
7. See also Donoghue and Heinl (Eds.), Making sense of European Justice & Home Affairs 
Policy: Ireland and the Lisbon Treaty (IIEA Paper Series, 2009), www.iiea.com/publications/
making-sense-of-european-justice-and-home-affairs-policy-ireland-and-the-lisbon-treaty 
(visited 2 Nov. 2009).
8. Fletcher, “Schengen, the European Court of Justice and Flexibility under the Lisbon 
Treaty: Balancing the United Kingdom’s ‘Ins’ and ‘Outs’”, 5 EuConst (2009), 71, at 76, citing 
George, An Awkward Partner: Britain in the European Union (OUP, Oxford, 1998) and Wall, 
Stranger in Europe: Britain and the European Union from Thatcher to Blair (OUP, Oxford, 
2008).
9. See ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/index_en.htm for the latest Irish results but cf. Flash, 
Eurobarometer Attitudes towards the European Union in the UK (Flash EB No. 274 – Gallup, 
2009). On EU referendum voting patterns and statistics for Ireland, see Hogan and Whyte (Eds.), 
Kelly: The Irish Constitution, 4th ed. (Lexis-Nexis, 2003), para 5.3.45 et seq.
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is rarely antagonistic and is usually rooted in the UK policy position.10 The 
failures of the Nice I and Lisbon I referenda have been portrayed in a variety 
of ways. Such portrayals, however, do not posit Euro-scepticism on the part of 
the Irish State or its people or relate it to Irish-British relations. 
 As to legal matters, Ireland of course shares a common law heritage with 
the UK for historical reasons but, unlike the UK, has had a strong constitu-
tional tradition since 1937, having a written Constitution which accords express 
powers of judicial review to the judiciary. The Irish judiciary is overwhelm-
ingly pro-Community. Key legal doctrines of European Union law regarding, 
for example, supremacy and direct effect – well-established from the outset of 
Irish membership of the EEC (as it then was) at the same time as the UK in 
1973 – were embraced earlier and more readily than amongst the British judi-
ciary and almost half of the Irish Supreme Court bench, including the Chief 
Justice, have served as former member of the Court of Justice in Luxembourg.11 
In the past, many UK legislative measures have been transposed into Irish law, 
particularly in the area of criminal law and, more controversially, in recent 
times relating to the incorporation of the European Convention on Human 
Rights.12
  There are some who suggest that the continued Irish support for British pol-
icies in European affairs during the UK Blair Government years was to the 
detriment of Ireland, at the expense of developing ongoing links and strategic 
alliances in policy and practices with Continental countries.13 Moreover, it is 
asserted that there has been a continual “drift” by the main Irish Government 
party, Fianna Fáil, in power continuously for over a decade to the present day,14 
towards closer association with Britain, entailing that it is now necessary to 
avoid feeding renewed continental suspicions that Ireland is a veritable “ British 
10. See Brown, The Debate on the Future of the European Union in Ireland (IIEA, Dublin, 
2003), quoting an address give by the then Minister for Foreign Affairs and current Taoiseach, 
Mr. Brian Cowen T.D., prior to the signing of the Constitutional Treaty. 
11. See Fahey, Practice and Procedure in Preliminary References to Europe: 30 years of 
Article 234 EC case law from the Irish Courts (Firstlaw, Dublin, 2007), pp. 106–108, and Fahey, 
“A Constitutional crisis in a tea-cup: The supremacy of EC law in Ireland”, 14 EPL (2009), 515. 
See also Hogan and Whelan, Ireland and the European Union: Constitutional and Statutory 
Texts and Commentary (Butterworths, Dublin, 1995) and Phelan, Revolt or Revolution: The 
Con stitutional Boundaries of the European Community (Roundhall, 1997). See, however, on the 
mild reception of the Law Lords for European Community law from accession until the transfer 
of the Committee’s functions to the UK Supreme Court in 2009, see Arnull, “The Law Lords and 
the European Union: Swimming with the incoming tide”, 35 EL Rev. (2010), 57, at 81. 
12. The (Irish) European Convention on Human Rights Act 2003 is largely based on the 
Human Rights Act 1998, despite Ireland having a written Constitution since 1937, according 
express powers of judicial review to the judiciary. 
13. See Fitzgerald, op. cit. supra note 6. 
14. Along with the Green Party since the General Election in 2007.
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satellite.”15 This party has only recently joined the Liberal Group in the Euro-
pean Parliament and has come under some degree of criticism for the manner 
in which it has begun to operate within this political dynamic – for abstaining 
from critical votes, for example.16 Irish-European politics is manifestly not at 
the heart of mainstream European politics. 
 In the context of the Third Pillar, Ireland, like the UK, did not accept the 
jurisdiction of the Court of Justice pursuant to Article 35 TEU (pre-Lisbon) 
and voluminous judgments, for example, have been delivered by the Irish 
Supreme Court as to the European arrest warrant, often raising serious sub-
stantive and procedural issues as a matter of European Union law, in the 
absence of supervision from the Court of Justice.17 In more recent times, seri-
ous reservations expressed over Irish participation, for example in the Euro-
pean arrest warrant, are well-documented, on account of national sovereignty 
and Ireland’s common law criminal justice legal order.18 However, the need to 
respond effectively to terrorism in the wake of 11 September 2001 was prior-
itized by the Irish State. It is notable that accounts of the lead-in to the adop-
tion of the European arrest warrant do not place the UK as part of the factual 
matrix or political dynamic operating behind Irish concerns. Ireland (but not 
the UK) was notably outvoted recently in the Council of Ministers during the 
adoption of the Data Retention Directive and litigated this isolation unsuccess-
fully.19 This legal challenge, on account of being outvoted, represented an 
unusual move for the Irish State on its own accord, since this traditionally did 
not lead such challenges at European Union level. Litigation trends before the 
Court of Justice indicate that Ireland frequently supports the UK in direct 
actions and preliminary references.20 
15. See Fitzgerald, op. cit. supra note 6. Arguably, he fails to consider the importance of 
post-Belfast Agreement Good Friday (Good Friday Agreement) Peace Deal developments in 
1998 and their resulting inﬂuence on British-Irish relations. 
16. Fianna Fáil were until recently part of a now defunct anti-federalist grouping within the 
European Parliament, demonstrating that ﬁnding a European political family has not been an 
easy task for the Centre-right main coalition Government party.
17. See O.J. 2005, L 327/19; O.J. 2005, C 120/24; O.J. 2005, L 327/19.
18. O’Mahony and Payne, Negotiating European Issues: National Strategies and Priorities 
(OEUE Phase I Occasional Paper 1.2–11.03), who provide a superb account of the political 
negotiation of the European arrest warrant from an Irish perspective. 
19. Directive 2006/24/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2006 
on the retention of data generated or processed in connection with the provision of publicly 
available electronic communications services or of public communications networks and amend-
ing Directive 2002/58/EC, O.J. 2006, C 237/5. See C-301/06, Ireland v. Council and European 
Parliament, [2009] ECR I-593. The actions may be attributable to the out-spoken stance of a 
recent Minister for Justice: see Fahey, “The Irish Challenge to the Data Retention Directive: 
Reﬂecting on Irish litigation in the European Legal Order,” Paper delivered at Society of Legal 
Scholars Annual Conference (Sept. 2008), available from the author.
20. Fahey, ibid. 
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 In more recent times, during the Treaty of Lisbon negotiations, the Irish 
Minister for Foreign Affairs came under pressure domestically not to opt-out 
of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and not to position Ireland strategically 
alongside the UK and Poland, where a more hard-line negotiating stance was 
apparent.21 The influences and pressures the UK Government brought to bear 
on the content of the Decision in 2009 of the Heads of State and Government 
within the auspices of the European Council – eventually becoming a legal 
decision of the European Council – prior to the second Treaty of Lisbon ref-
erendum in Ireland, were of much significance and are considered below in 
more detail.22 
 Prior to examining the Treaty of Lisbon changes – the real subject of anal-
ysis in this article – the Common Travel Area is first considered, given that it 
is the perceived basis for the Irish and British special arrangements in the 
Schengen Protocol and the special Protocols on Ireland and the UK. 
3. The Common Travel Area between Ireland and the UK as the basis 
for the arrangements in the Schengen Protocol
The Common Travel Area between Ireland and the UK is arguably the most 
important explanatory factor of Irish policy choices in European affairs affect-
ing in particular its landmass and borders.23 The Common Travel Area has its 
origins subsequent to the creation of the Irish Free State in 1922, when it 
became classed as a dominion, where previously Aliens Law had been enforced 
at Irish ports as in the UK.24 Thus, upon the establishment of the Free State, a 
passport system was not established between the two countries. The account 
of the origins of the Common Travel Area is well documented elsewhere; 
 suffice it to say that it was administrative and extra-legal in its origins and 
operation, and was maintained by both countries for obviously pragmatic pur-
poses without complications prior to the 1990s.25 Remarkably, it has no basis 
21. Witness, for example, the furore at national level as to the decision of the Government on 
whether to opt-out of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, ultimately not taken on account of the 
reaction of Trade Unions in Ireland: Irish Times, 5 Oct. 2007; see also “Ireland and Poland get 
‘opt-out’ option on EU rights charter,” EU Observer, 26 June 2007. Limiting the scope of the 
Charter represented one of the red lines of the UK (but not Irish) negotiating teams. 
22. See section 8 infra. 
23. The physical attachment of Northern Ireland, part of the UK, to the Southern Republic, 
remains the other critical factor in the background explanation. 
24. The leading analysis considering the historical and legal motivations for its operation is 
that of Ryan, “The Common Travel Area between Britain and Ireland,” 64 MLR (2001), 855. 
25. Ibid.
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in Irish Constitutional law, despite the privileges that it bestows on citizens, 
for example, between Southern and Northern Ireland, an issue suggested to be 
here of some importance. A complicated inter-relationship between the two 
States exists as regards nationality and citizenship respectively for each other’s 
citizens, whereby the privileges and benefits granted by each country to the 
nationals of the other are quite different. This complexity is exacerbated by 
the Northern Ireland question, the Good Friday Agreement, European Union 
Citizenship and free movement law and major changes in Citizenship and 
Nationality law in Ireland in 2004 following on from an immigration boom.26 
Unsurprisingly, leading cases in EU law as to the free movement of persons 
and citizenship have been generated by the water borders and travel areas 
between the two States.27
 The Common Travel Area was of enormous importance in the context of 
Northern Irish relations with the Republic in the South, and to the operation 
of trade in all parts of the island and was a feature of social interchanges there.28 
As Ryan states, the Common Travel Area acquired new prominence in the 
Treaty of Amsterdam, where it was confirmed that Britain and Ireland would 
remain separate from the Schengen system of open borders by means of cer-
tain Protocols attached to that Treaty and the “special relationship” between 
the two countries was acknowledged.29 However, more recently, the Common 
Travel Area has been the subject of a British Government (and not Irish Gov-
ernment) review that could have seen its abolition by the UK, as a result of 
26. Ibid. The Irish Constitution was amended in the wake of the Good Friday Agreement in 
respect of Irish Citizenship law and the immigration boom into the Celtic Tiger economy: now 
see Arts. 2 and 9 of the Irish Constitution and the Irish Nationality and Immigration Act 2001 and 
the Twenty-Seventh Amendment of the Constitution Act 2004. Prior to these changes, the entitle-
ment of persons born on the island to citizenship was statutory in origin and not everyone born 
on the island was entitled to citizenship. See the account of Mulally, “Deﬁning the limits of citi-
zenship: Family life, immigration and ‘non-nationals’ in Irish law”, 39 Irish Jurist (2004), 334, 
and for the position prior to the changes by way of referendum, which restricted the rights of 
Irish-born children to citizenship in certain instances where their parents were non-nationals, 
Hogan and Whyte, op. cit. supra note 9, para 3.3.01 onwards. 
27. Case C-109/01, Secretary of State for the Home Department v. Akrich, [2003] ECR 
I-9607; Case C-200/02, Zhu and Chen v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, [2004] 
ECR I-9925; Case C-127/08, Metock v. Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform, [2008] 
ECR I-86241.
28. See Ryan, op. cit. supra note 23, 874: “The success of the common travel area in the 
eighty years since the establishment of the Irish Free State has been due to a combination of 
 factors… has been a pragmatic response by Britain and Ireland to the practical and political dif-
ﬁculties associated with an effective immigration frontier at the Irish border…” 
29. Ibid. Certain airline carriers, such as Ryanair, operating a signiﬁcant number of routes 
between the UK and Ireland, still require the production of a passport from citizens travelling 
within the Common Travel Area and have made no special concession for this since the advent 
of its online check-in system. See www.ryanair.com, “Travel Documentation.” 
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fears of terrorism. This would have resulted in passport controls on Irish citi-
zens travelling to the UK. The potential impact on the Schengen Protocol, dis-
cussed below, of the abolition of the Common Travel Area would obviously 
have been dramatic. The expressed rationale for this unilateral review was 
essentially that, in light of dramatic increases in mobility, privileges bestowed 
on Common Travel Area nationals might be abused by others, for example, 
facilitating illegal immigration, crime, smuggling and tax evasion; it was per-
ceived by some as leaving a critical gap in the intelligence picture.30 Responses 
to the review of the Common Travel Area were commonly negative and thus 
adverse to its amendment and respondees cited travel delays, costs, burdens 
on airline carriers and the inadequacy of port and travel infrastructure as rea-
sons for maintaining the status quo and not introducing passport controls.31 
Fears were also expressed by British Conservatives that changes to the Com-
mon Travel Area could have left Northern Irish citizens isolated, even requir-
ing them to produce a passport to enter Great Britain from Northern Ireland.32 
The unilateral act of review was also portrayed with alarmist tones in the Irish 
media and was perceived as an insensitive attack on cordial and carefully-
honed, modern day British-Irish relations. The ultimate position reached of no 
change was met with relief.33 
 The challenges faced by land masses surrounded by waters in the context 
of joining the Schengen area are not, however, insurmountable.34 There are 
various precedents involving, for example, Lithuania and Kalingrad; a special 
transit document system remains a possibility, as do the type of arrangements 
in place for Nordic citizens in Denmark.35 Arguably, however, the impact of 
30. “Final Impact Assessment of Common Travel Area,” (UK Home Ofﬁce Border Agen-
cy, 15 Jan. 2009) www.ukba.homeofﬁce.gov.uk/sitecontent/documents/aboutus/consultations/
closedconsultations/strentheningthecommontravelarea/ﬁnal_ia_of_cta_reform.pdf?view= 
Binary, (visited 2 Nov. 2009).
31. “Strengthening the Common Travel Area- Government Reponses to the Public Consulta-
tion” www.ukba.homeofﬁce.gov.uk/sitecontent/documents/aboutus/consultations/closedconsul-
tations/strentheningthecommontravelarea/, (UK Home Ofﬁce Border Agency, 15 Jan. 2009) 
visited 2 Nov. 2009). 
32. “Common Travel Area Retained,” (16 July 2009) Irish Times.
33. Ibid. The House of Lords voted against the Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Bill in 
2009. A joint statement was issued by both the Irish and British governments afﬁrming the ben-
eﬁts of the Common Travel Area in 2008: see “Joint Statement regarding the Common Travel 
Area,” (Department of Justice, Equality and Law Reform, 24 July 2008): see www.justice.ie/
en/JELR/Pages/Joint%20Statement%20regarding%20the%20Common%20Travel%20Area, 
(last visited 11 Dec. 2009). 
34. See the views outlined in Wiener, “Forging Flexibility- the British ‘No’ to Schengen”, 
Arena Working Papers WP 00/1, available www.arena.uio.no/publications/wp00_1.htm, (visited 
2 Nov. 2009). 
35. See Protocol No. 5 on the transit of persons by land between the region of Kaliningrad 
and other parts of the Russian Federation in the Lithuania Accession Treaty in 2003. Also of note 
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constitutional rules on Irish Citizenship would affect the application of such a 
system to Northern Ireland. The unilateral review of the Common Travel Area 
in the wake of the rejection of the first Treaty of Lisbon referendum was per-
haps a somewhat ill-timed move by the British Government, but nonetheless 
it remains extant as a key feature of the Irish-European legal landscape. The 
situation also remains susceptible to change in the event of a change in gov-
ernment in the UK.
 Prior to considering all the Irish Protocols, Declarations and Guarantees 
associated with the Treaty of Lisbon, the Irish and UK provisions in the Schen-
gen Protocol and the special Protocols on Ireland and the UK of the Treaty of 
Amsterdam merit consideration here, as they constitute the first and most 
important opt-out for the Irish State in the chronology of Irish-Euro relations 
and Ireland’s water borders.
4. Schengen Protocol and the Irish (and UK)36 arrangements: 
From Amsterdam to Lisbon 
4.1. Background
As is well known, the Schengen Area Agreement is an awesome achievement, 
designed to remove border controls among the participating States. The 
Schengen Area covers 22 Member States (9 newer States and 13 existing 
States) and Iceland, Norway and Switzerland, and 400 million citizens. Ireland 
and the UK, however, have enjoyed the provisions of a generously negotiated 
opt-out opt-in from the Agreement since 1997, set out in the so-called Schengen 
Protocol (the full title being: Protocol integrating the Schengen acquis into the 
framework of the European Union). In addition, two particular Protocols for 
both countries accompanied the Treaty of Amsterdam: the Protocol on the 
application of certain aspects of Article [14 EC] to the United Kingdom and 
to Ireland, concerning border controls (which actually refers to the Common 
Travel Area); and the Protocol on the position of the United Kingdom and 
Ireland, which concerns the opt-out and opt-in for Title IV, the Area of Freedom 
is the fact that citizens of Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden are free to enter, reside, 
study and work in Denmark, outside the Schengen Area as it is, and they do not need a visa, 
residence or work permit. See also the special arrangements in place for Danish Nationality for 
the citizens of Nordic countries Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden: Danish immigration 
Ministry www.nyidanmark.dk/en-us/citizenship/danish_nationality/nordic_nationals.htm, (last 
visited 8 Jan. 2009). 
36. Albeit that the analysis which follows here relates solely to the Irish position where pos-
sible.
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Security and Justice. Remarkably, the Irish Parliament has never debated an 
Irish opt-in to the Schengen Area since its negotiated opt-out opt-in.37 An Irish 
diplomat describing the protracted and fractious Irish negotiations leading up 
to the Treaty of Amsterdam, put the Common Travel Area between the two 
States as the primary reason for the provisions negotiated for the two States, 
and no more.38 This is unquestionably the original motivation for the Protocol 
opt-outs obtained by Ireland. That the Schengen acquis now constitutes a costly 
and difﬁ cult condition of accession for new applicant Member States to the 
European underscores the historical anomaly that the opt-out arrangements 
represent.39 
 From the Treaty of Amsterdam to the Treaty of Lisbon, the position had 
been that Ireland and the UK were not bound by the Schengen acquis incor-
porated into Community law by the Treaties but could opt-in to all or part of 
Schengen, subject to a decision in favour by the Council acting with unani-
mous approval of the Schengen Area States.40 Ireland and the UK are obliged 
to participate in measures which build upon the Schengen acquis into which 
they have already opted. Co-extensively, a “lock-out” rule applied, where other 
Member State could refuse their participation in measures building upon mea-
sures into which they had not already opted, the subject of recent controver-
sial decisions of the Court, discussed below.41 Kuijper has indicated that there 
were those, particularly in the Commission, who would argue that the opt-in 
opt-out has had a particularly negative influence on Community law, espe-
cially on the scope and nature of certain Commission proposals.42 The special 
position of the United Kingdom and Ireland is now acutely unusual and com-
plex, yet there have been many who have suggested that the traditional “water 
borders” explanation for the British (and correlatively Irish) “apartness” from 
Schengen is not an insurmountable barrier and that a British (and by extension 
Irish) decision to join Schengen would not necessarily imply a set-back com-
pared to the current system of border controls.43 In fact, in late 2007, Ireland 
37. Senator O’Toole, 195 Oireachtas Debates (No. 16, 10 June, 2009): see www.oireachtas.
ie. 
38. McDonagh, Original Sin in a Brave New World: An Account of the Negotiation of the 
Treaty of Amsterdam (IIEA, Dublin, 1998).
39. See supra section 6.2. 
40. In practice, Ireland and the UK carry out checks and surveillance at their borders with 
other EU Member States but participate to some degree in part of the Schengen acquis, pursuant 
to Decisions discussed below, section 4.2.
41. See House of Lords Select Committee on European Union, The Treaty of Lisbon: an 
impact assessment (10th Report, Session 2007-08, HL Paper 62), para 6.254, detailing the evi-
dence of Prof. Peers.
42. Kuijper, “The Evolution of the Third Pillar from Maastricht to the European Constitu-
tion: Institutional Aspects”, 41 CML Rev. (2004), 609, at 621–623. 
43. Ibid.
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was repeatedly asked to join the Schengen Area, prior to the signing of the 
Treaty of Lisbon.44 Accounts of the special arrangements rarely attribute “apart-
ness” to the Irish State but rather to the UK and the narrative depicting the 
State actors is dramatically one-sided in this regard.
4.2. The lexicon of the Irish and UK “special arrangements” in the   
 Amsterdam Protocols
The literature on the Protocol arrangements for the UK and Ireland is exten-
sive45 and is replete with expressions that often do not find currency in legal 
articles. This is arguably because the Schengen Agreement and the Amsterdam 
Protocols form a legal expression of a political compromise, one asserted to 
be so difficult now that it has reached the point that it no longer works properly. 
The Protocol arrangements are thus described as “special”, “alarming,” “fiend-
ishly complicated” and “bizarre”46 and the inherent complexity of the canvas 
that is the Schengen acquis is described almost amusingly (unintentionally) 
by one commentator as “mysterious law”47 and by others as a “clever … per-
haps too clever piece of drafting.”48 Undoubtedly, then, negative overtones 
have been manifest in more recent times as to “Schengen law,” disengaging it 
from its substantive meaning – being truly free movement – as there are now 
many human rights objections registered about the Agreement and its opera-
tion  generally, the discussion of which is outside the scope of this work gen-
erally.49 The point made here, however, is that the unusual lexicon which it has 
44. “Ireland urged to support EU Justice, Security policy,” (19 Sep. 2007) Irish Times. 
45. Kuijper, “Some Legal Problems Associated with the Communitarization of Policy on 
Visa, Asylum and Immigration under the Amsterdam Treaty and Incorporation of the Schengen 
Acquis”, 37 CML Rev. (2000), 345, at 365; Baldaccini, Guild and Toner (Eds.), Whose Freedom, 
Security & Justice? European Union Immigration and Asylum Law and Policy (Hart, Oxford 
and Portland, Oregon, 2007); Hedeman Robinson, “The Area of Freedom, Security and Justice 
with regard to the UK, Ireland and Denmark: The Opt-in Opt-outs under the Treaty of Amster-
dam” in O’Keeffe and Twomey (Eds.), Legal Issues of the Amsterdam Treaty (Hart, Oxford, 
1999), at p. 291. 
46. Kuijper, op. cit. supra note 44; Editorial, “Neither a bang nor a whimper”, 34 CML Rev. 
(1997), 767, at 770; House of Lords Select Committee on the European Union, Schengen and the 
United Kingdom’s Border Controls (7th Report, Session 1998–1999, HL Paper 37).
47. As Kuijper notes, op. cit. supra note 44, a key phrase employed in the Schengen Protocol 
so as to permit an opt-in is that the measure to which the UK or Ireland wishes to opt-in must be 
“building upon” the Schengen acquis, albeit that it was unknown what “the mysterious category 
of subjects building upon the Schengen acquis” in fact was. This phrase, “building upon,” has 
now been subjected to an interpretation by the Court of Justice that excludes the participation of 
Ireland and the UK, discussed in section 4 infra.
48. Editorial, op. cit. supra note 45, 767, at 768 and 770. 
49. See Mac Einri, “The implications for Ireland and the UK arising from the development 
of recent EU policy on Migration” in Ireland, Schengen and the Common Travel Area (2002), 
available at migration.ucc.ie/schengencta.htm (visited 2 Nov. 2009). 
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generated compounds myths and reinforces public misunderstandings over 
European Union integration generally, and the negative lexicon is not gener-
ally Irish-specific.
 The original provisions relating to the UK and Ireland of the Schengen Pr o-
tocol are contained in Articles 4 and 5 thereof, which provide as follows: 
“4. Ireland and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, 
which are not bound by the Schengen acquis, may at any time request to 
take part in some or all of the provisions of this acquis. 
The Council shall decide on the request with the unanimity of its members 
referred to in Article 1 and of the representative of the Government of the 
State concerned.
5... 
In this context, where either Ireland or the United Kingdom or both have 
not notiﬁed the President of the Council in writing within a reasonable 
period that they wish to take part, the authorisation … shall be deemed to 
have been granted to the Member States referred to in Article 1 and to 
Ireland or the United Kingdom where either of them wishes to take part in 
the areas of cooperation in question...”
The Commission, has perhaps unsurprisingly, expressed its support for a 
strictly operational and effective opt-in regime, holding rigorously to the terms 
of Articles 4 and 5 of the Schengen Protocol: “The Schengen Protocol inte-
grated the Schengen acquis in the framework of the European Union: … this 
integration has not given rise to a renegotiation of the acquis as it was designed 
in the previous intergovernmental framework. The Commission’s view is that 
there are no circumstances under which a request to participate pursuant to 
Article 4 could be the occasion for such a renegotiation…”50
 On the basis of Article 4 of the Schengen Protocol, the Council has adopted 
two decisions, one for the UK51 and one for Ireland – the latter having applied 
two years later than the former to participate, a time lag that may be interpreted 
in various ways, as either tardy, uncertain, reflective, uncooperative or 
 politically astute.52 There is little evidence existing to provide a determinative 
view. Both countries in practice participate closely in police and judicial 
50. SEC(1999) 1198 ﬁnal. Referred to as “Commission’s guiding principles vis a vis requests 
pursuant to Article 4 of the Schengen Protocol” in Commission Opinion on the request by Ire-
land to take part in some of the provisions of the Schengen acquis (SEC(2000) 1439 ﬁnal).
51. Decision 2000/365/EC, O.J. 2000, L 131/43.
52. Decision 2002/192/EC, O.J. 2002, L 64/20. Twenty-seven acts are enumerated here. 
However, see Peers, Statewatch Analysis EU Lisbon Treaty, (No. 4) UK and Irish opt-outs from 
European Union Justice and Home Affairs Law (26 June 2009) (www.statewatch.org/news/2009/
jun/uk-ireland-analysis-no-4-lisbon-opt-outs.pdf) (visited 2 Nov. 2009), Annex IV, The author 
made a Freedom of Information request to the Irish Department of Justice in Oct. 2009 for a 
complete listing of Irish opt-ins and opt-outs from EU Justice and Home Affairs since the 
 ratiﬁcation of the Treaty of Amsterdam to date pursuant to (1) Schengen Acquis and (2) EC 
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 cooperation in criminal matters, the fight against drugs and the Schengen Infor-
mation System. The Decision from 2002 as to Ireland begins with the first 
recital as follows, in atypical format; the language is worth recalling:
“whereas (1) Ireland has a special position … Article 6(2): From the date 
of the adoption of this Decision, Ireland shall be deemed irrevocably to 
have notiﬁed the President of the Council…”53 (emphasis supplied). 
A Declaration on Article 4 of the Schengen Protocol was annexed to the Final 
Act of the Treaty of Amsterdam inviting the Council to seek the opinion of the 
Commission before deciding on a request, and to use their best efforts to allow 
the UK and Ireland if they wished to use Article 4.54 Of course the ultimate 
question that remains in all matters of European Union law and policy is – to 
rephrase the question put by Peers – just how “ECJ proofed” could the text 
be?55 The Court of Justice has recently put that question to bed in a particularly 
controversial decision which is considered below, and whereby the answer is 
that no text is unequivocally “ECJ proofed” and that the substance of the 
Declaration was readily capable of being overlooked.56 The “special position” 
is referred to frequently throughout the text of the decisions pursuant to Articles 
4 and 5 as to the place of Ireland and the UK and their unusual treatment. 
 However, the “special” character of the decision is adversely affected by 
recent judgments of the Court of Justice and is the subject of analysis in the 
next section. 
5. Decisions of the Court of Justice on the Schengen Protocol prior to 
the Treaty of Lisbon changes
There are only two decisions of the Court of Justice to date on the Schengen 
Protocol arrangements for the UK and Ireland that have provoked much by 
way of comment.57 Both of the decisions relate to attempts by the UK, and not 
Immigration, Asylum & Civil law, and was contacted by the Department of Justice to withdraw 
the request. 
53. Emphasis added. 
54. See Declarations No. 45 on Art. 4 of the Schengen Protocol and Declaration No. 46 on 
Art. 5 of the Schengen Protocol.
55. Peers, “Caveat Emptor: Integrating the Schengen Acquis into the European Union legal 
order”, 2 CYELS (2000), 87.
56. Alternatively, the Council’s wish is evident – that the ﬁnal judgment is for the Court of 
Justice: Kuijper, op. cit. supra note 44, at 353. 
57. Cases C-77/05, United Kingdom v. Council of the European Union, [2007] ECR I-11459; 
Case C-137/05, United Kingdom v. Council of the European Union, [2007] ECR I-11593. See 
Rijpma, annotation of Case C-77/05, United Kingdom v. Council and Case C-137/05, United 
Kingdom v. Council, 45 CML Rev. (2008), 835; Fletcher, op. cit. supra note 8; Peers, op. cit. 
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Ireland, to avail of the provisions of the Protocol and to take part in certain 
Schengen measures. In reality, Ireland is substantially affected by the outcome 
of the cases despite its peripheral place in the particular proceedings, and the 
two referenda campaigns in Ireland took surprisingly little interest in the deci-
sions. Notably, at UK Cabinet level, the decision had been taken that a narrow 
view would be adopted of what constituted a “proposal to build upon the 
Schengen acquis”, limiting this to proposals which amended or supplemented 
an existing Schengen measure, and the view had been expressed that the UK 
would never wish to take part in a measure to build upon a measure forming 
part of the Schengen acquis without first having elected to be bound by that 
original measure.58 Little evidence exists as a matter of scholarly or official 
documentation as to the operation of Articles 4 and 5 from an Irish perspective. 
The importance of the decisions of the Court of Justice then merits their con-
sideration in this light. 
 Thus, in United Kingdom v. Council,59 the UK, supported by Ireland, sought 
the annulment of Council Regulation (EC) No. 2007/2004 of 26 October 2004 
establishing a European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooper-
ation at the External Borders.60 The Commission put forward the proposal to 
establish the agency in 2003, and in 2004 the UK confirmed to the Council its 
intention to take part in the adoption of Regulation No. 2007/2004 pursuant 
to the procedure set out in Article 5(1) of the Schengen Protocol, set out above. 
Despite the UK’s notification, it was not allowed to take part in the Regula-
tion adopted, on the ground that it constituted a development of provisions of 
the Schengen acquis in which the UK did not take part. The UK then chal-
lenged the refusal to allow it to take part, alleging that the refusal constituted 
a breach of Article 5 of the Protocol, and that the system as set out in Article 
5 was not subordinate to that established in Article 4 and was incompatible 
with Declaration No. 45 of the Treaty of Amsterdam on the Schengen Proto-
col. 
 The Court of Justice, in a particularly controversial judgment, upheld the 
refusal to allow the UK to take part, and held that: “… participation of a 
supra note 51; House of Lords Select Committee on European Union, cited supra note 40, con-
sidered above here in further detail; House of Lords Select Committee on European Union, UK 
Participation in the Schengen Acquis (5th Report, Session 1999–2000, HL Paper 34); Kingston, 
op. cit. supra note 2. 
58. See House of Lords Select Committee on European Scrutiny, The Incorporation of 
Schengen into the European Union (31st Report, 1997–1998 Session, HL Paper 139). 
59. In the ﬁrst case (Case C-77/05), Ireland, Poland and the Slovak Republic supported the 
UK, while Spain and the Commission supported the Council. However, in the next decision dis-
cussed, Poland did support the UK and there too the Netherlands supported the Council. 
60. Council Regulation (EC) No. 2007/2004 of 26 Oct. 2004 establishing a European Agency 
for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders, O.J. 2004, L 349/1. 
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 Member State in the adoption of a measure pursuant to Article 5(1) of the 
Schengen Protocol is conceivable only to the extent that that State has accepted 
the area of the Schengen acquis which is the context of the measure or of which 
it is a development…”61 The Court held that checks on persons at the external 
borders of the Member States had to be regarded as constituting elements of 
the Schengen acquis and that the Regulation constituted a measure to build 
upon the Schengen acquis. The Court thus held that the two articles of the Pro-
tocol could not be read independently from each other, the effectiveness ratio-
nale being of significance in its reasoning. 
  Another decision was delivered the same day, and with essentially similar 
facts, United Kingdom v. Council of the European Union62 the UK also there 
sought the annulment of Council Regulation (EC) No. 2252/2004 on the stan-
dards for security features and biometrics in passports and travel documents 
issued by Member States,63 whereby the UK had been excluded from partici-
pation in its application. Ireland once again supported the UK in the proceed-
ings before the Court.64 Again, the UK submitted that the Council had been 
wrong to classify the Regulation as a measure developing provisions of the 
Schengen acquis. The Court, similarly rejecting the claim, held that checks on 
persons at the external borders constituted elements of the Schengen acquis. 
 The Court thus held that there was no basis for a distinction to be drawn 
between Schengen-related and Schengen-integral measures, the effectiveness 
rationale or l’éffet utile, being employed here once more. 
 There is a widespread consensus that the decisions of the Court were unex-
pected and set a tone that is strangely antagonistic towards any future partic-
ipation of the UK in the Schengen measures, decisions that will have 
repercussions for Ireland clearly.65 They have been depicted as sending out a 
powerful message to the beneficiaries of generously negotiated opt-outs that 
that “one cannot have one’s cake and eat it.”66 Notably, the judgment of the 
Court was delivered just a few days after the signing of the Treaty of Lisbon 
on 13 December 2007, containing an even more far-reaching opt-out for the 
UK and Ireland than that contained in the Constitutional Treaty, albeit with a 
61. Paras. 62–63. 
62. Case C-137/05, United Kingdom v. Council, cited supra note 56. 
63. Council Regulation (EC) No. 2252/2004 of 13 Dec. 2004 on standards for security fea-
tures and biometrics in passports and travel documents issued by Member States. O.J. 2004, 
L 385/1.
64. The UK was supported by Ireland and the Slovak Republic, whereas the Council was 
supported by Spain, the Netherlands and the Commission.
65. On the contrary, see Fletcher, op. cit. supra note 8, who states (at 87) “[th]ere is nothing 
in Article 5 of the Schengen Protocol regarding the UK or Ireland’s participation in measures 
building on the acquis requiring them to have ﬁrst participated in the original measure…” 
66. Rijpma, op. cit. supra note 56, at 851. 
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softer Irish position.67 Perhaps the Court’s judgments could contribute to the 
UK and Ireland’s integration in this part of (formerly) EC law, by confronting 
these Member States with the undesirable consequences of their non–partici-
pation in parts of the Schengen acquis, but the legal likelihood of this is far 
from apparent in the short term; and, rather, the negative interpretation is sug-
gested here to be the more realistic one, i.e. that the “outsider” Member States 
will less likely join in and that constitutional differentiation will become more 
real and hard-edged in future times, with less opting in.68 Irish commentators 
have described the decisions of the Court interpreting the UK opt-out opt-in 
as being both harsh and surprising and as disapproving of the UK and Irish 
“pick and choose” à la carte constitutional differentiation.69 Others have sug-
gested more benevolently that the cases did not concern the extent to which 
the UK could be forced to participate in a measure in which it did not want to 
take part, but rather the extent to which it was blocked from participating in a 
measure in which it did want to take part, a distinction of no small importance, 
that is prior to the changes effectuated by the Treaty of Lisbon.70
 Whatever view is correct, what is notable in both instances is that both the 
UK (and Ireland in support) sought to rely upon the Declarations attached to 
the Treaty relating to the Protocol, and in both instances the Court neither 
referred to nor appeared to take into account the Declarations in its decision. 
Of course, strictly speaking, Declarations are not legally binding. However, it 
is difficult to suggest that a purposive or teleological interpretation of a text 
which results in a highly exclusionary and antagonistic approach to constitu-
tional differentiation assists with the effectiveness or éffet utile of the text. This 
principle is employed here as legal whitewash for the Court overtly interven-
ing so as to thwart variable geometry taking place. Rijpma71 asserts, it is sub-
mitted here with much force, that the decision of the Court is explicable in so 
far as the Court wanted to bring back the focus on the underlying rationale of 
the Schengen acquis, namely the free movement of European Union citizens 
as part of the wider single market project. Whether this will be the net result 
of the decision of the Court remains questionable given that the reaction to the 
decision seems to consider the decision to be dissuasive and discouraging to 
UK participation and no more.72 It is easy then to conclude that variable 
67. See the discussion above in section 6. 
68. See Rijpma, op. cit. supra note 56.
69. See Kingston, op. cit. supra note 2, 851–852.
70. See House of Lords Select Committee on European Union, cited supra note 40, outlining 
the contentions of Prof. Shaw, at para 6.255.
71. See Rijpma, op. cit. supra note 56.
72. It is suggested here that it is not unduly pessimistic to assert as Rijpma, ibid. does, that as 
the Court gave a very broad interpretation of the concept of “proposals and initiatives to build 
upon the Schengen acquis” and given that very few measures that have their legal basis in 
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 geometry has not really been much of a success nor is it likely to be in the 
future.73 The strong reaction provoked by the interventionist decisions of the 
Court further demonstrates that constitutional differentiation is a means of 
understanding a compromise that is more political than legal, and the Court 
cannot be relied upon as a matter of law to support or sustain the political con-
cept of constitutional differentiation. 
 The opt-outs and opt-ins negotiated, as set out in the Treaty of Lisbon, dis-
cussed next, appear all the more futile in the wake of the decisions of the Court. 
6. Treaty of Lisbon and the Irish protocols and declarations employed 
to ratify the Treaty of Lisbon
6.1. The 2007 Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) mandate and the Irish  
 negotiating position for the Treaty of Lisbon
An opt-out from the entire Area of Freedom, Security and Justice eventually 
secured by the UK and Ireland in the Treaty of Lisbon, however, was not part 
of the failed Constitutional Treaty and at no point was such an opt-out even 
the subject of discussion as part of the negotiations for the Constitutional 
Treaty.74 Working Group X on Freedom Security and Justice in their Final 
Report to the Convention on the Future of Europe had as a general concern 
the opt-in opt-out arrangements for the UK and Ireland.75 Formerly, in the 
Constitutional Treaty, it was provided (in Protocol No. 19) thereto, that Ireland 
and the UK would have a range of opt-outs from policies in respect of border 
controls, asylum and immigration, judicial cooperation in civil matters and on 
police cooperation. In the lead-up to the adoption of the Treaty of Lisbon, the 
Irish State was publicly urged by the EU Justice Commissioner to support 
(former) Title IV EC will fail to qualify as a Schengen developing measure, consequently the 
scope of the Title IV EC Protocol has been drastically reduced. The restrictive approach of the 
Court here is particularly striking. Importantly, Rijpma, (ibid.) suggests that the Court’s judg-
ment casts doubt on the Council’s past practice of allowing the UK and Ireland to participate 
under Art. 3 of the Title IV EC Protocol, for example, the ARGO programme for administrative 
cooperation in the ﬁelds of asylum, visa, immigration and external borders and Council Direc-
tive 2001/40/EC of 28 May 2001 on the mutual recognition of decisions on the expulsion of third 
country nationals (O.J. 2001, L 149/34), whereas Fletcher (op. cit. supra note 8, 97) states that a 
key ﬁnding of the decision of the Court casts doubt on the validity of Art. 8(2) of the UK Deci-
sion and Art. 6(2) of the Irish Decision taken previously pursuant to the provisions of the Schen-
gen Protocol.
73. This is the thrust of the comments of Kuijper, op. cit. supra note 41, 609.
74. Peers, op. cit. supra note 51, 8.
75. Convention on the Future of Europe Final Report of Working Group X, “Freedom, Secu-
rity and Justice”, (Conv. 426/02, 2 Dec. 2002; WG X 14), 25. 
Irish (-British)-Euro Relations 691
justice and security policies and not to remove itself from such matters.76 The 
revised Schengen Protocol does not differ substantially in its current format 
to that as attached to the Constitutional Treaty, rendering the (opt-in) opt-out 
as to the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice all the more remarkable, as 
considered below. Efforts were made during the Finnish Presidency in 2006 
to implement some of the Justice and Home Affairs communitarizing provi-
sions of the Constitutional Treaty but these were not supported by even a bare 
majority of Member States. It is said that it came as a surprise to many that 
under the German Presidency of 2007 such rapid progress was made in creat-
ing a successor document to the Constitutional Treaty with all of the major 
provisions on Justice and Home Affairs which figured in the Constitutional 
Treaty.77 However, the political context had altered by 2007, particularly with 
the advent of new leaders in the UK, France and Germany. 
 In the Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) mandate in 2007 to “de-consti-
tutionalize” the Constitutional Treaty, it was expressly stated that the Irish posi-
tion on the scope of the Schengen Protocol and the Protocol on the position of 
UK and Ireland (the Title IV EC Protocol) and changes thereto would be 
reserved at that point in time. It provided that:
“Moreover, the scope of the Protocol on the position of the United King-
dom and Ireland (1997) will be extended so as to include, in relation to the 
UK, and on the same terms, the Chapters on judicial cooperation in crimi-
nal matters and on police cooperation. It may also address the application 
of the Protocol in relation to Schengen building measures and amendments 
to existing measures. This extension will take account of the UK’s position 
nder the previously existing Union acquis in these areas. Ireland will 
determine in due course its position with regard to that extension.”78
As far as Ireland’s role in the European Union is concerned, 2007 may be sum-
marized as a year where the State remained committed to preserving the main 
body of the Lisbon Treaty and implementing the Lisbon Strategy for jobs and 
economic growth.79 Many events were hosted by the Irish State in 2007 to 
celebrate the fiftieth anniversary of the signing of the Treaty of Rome.80 
Politically and institutionally – and both prior to and subsequent to the 
76. Supra note 44; “State could be left out of EU justice measures”, (5 Oct. 2007) Irish 
Times.
77. Donnelly, “Justice and Home Affairs in the Lisbon Treaty: A Constitutionalising Clariﬁ-
cation”, 1 EIPA Scope (2008), 21. 
78. IGC Mandate, Council of the European Union, (11218/07, Brussels, 26 June 2007), (l) 
p. 8. Emphasis supplied.
79. See Rees, “Ireland’s Foreign Relations in 2007”, 19 Irish Studies in International Affairs 
(2008), 227. 
80. Ibid. 
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 negotiation of the Treaty of Lisbon – an outwardly “negative” policy position 
as to the communitarization of the entire Area of Freedom, Security and Justice 
is not generally discernible as a matter of politics. It is thus particularly remark-
able that at no stage throughout period, in the literature, publications, Lisbon 
I and II referenda in Ireland or in the IGC mandate that led to the drafting of 
the Treaty of Lisbon, was there any evidence of an overtly antagonistic or 
protective nationalistic stance being adopted by the Irish Government as to the 
Area of Freedom, Security and Justice and on the contrary, the narrative was 
in the other direction, i.e. that the State was being urged to participate in Justice 
measures. Moreover, Ladenburger has stated that the IGC mandate: “… left 
one single matter open for intense negotiation in the group of legal experts…
it [concerned] how to articulate the relationship between the extension of the 
UK’s (and Ireland’s) opt-out opt-in regimes to the Third Pillar area and the 
pre-existing obligations of the United Kingdom in this area, in the light of 
communitarisation. The UK made three concrete requests …all based on the 
same motivation: not to be forced into any communitarised legislation against 
the UK’s will…”81
 It is hard to attribute or relate such motivations to the Irish position to the 
same degree and they certainly do not receive official recognition during this 
period in the Irish media nor in the scholarship generally.82 Remarkably, at the 
same time as Ireland obtained such a far-reaching opt out from the Area of 
Freedom, Security and Justice in the Treaty of Lisbon, the Danish Government 
set out plans to hold a referendum on the Danish opt-outs in the Area of Free-
dom, Security and Justice, ultimately abandoned, but nonetheless demonstrat-
ing that the isolationist stance of the Danish, interpreted far beyond that 
intended, was increasingly viewed with unease both at home and abroad.83
 The next issue for consideration is the revisions to the Schengen Protocol 
after the Treaty of Lisbon, specific to Ireland and the UK.
6.2. The revised Schengen Protocol after Lisbon
The most significant of the minor revisions to the Schengen Protocol (Protocol 
No. 19) made by the Treaty of Lisbon, is a substantially more detailed Article 
81. Ladenburger, “Police and Criminal law in the Treaty of Lisbon: A New Dimension for the 
Community Method”, 4 EuConst (2008), 20, at 28. Emphasis supplied by the present author. 
82. As to which, see Smyth, “Justice co-operation- opting in or just opting out?”, Irish Times, 
5 May, 2008..
83. Kuijper, op. cit. supra note 41, 621–623; see the account also in (8 Aug. 2008) EU Busi-
ness www.eubusiness.com/news-eu/1218205023.2/ (last visited 26 Nov. 2009). Kuijper point-
edly comments that other Member States have been somewhat unsophisticated at this game – they 
have permitted not only the UK and Ireland, but even Denmark, with its rather atypical views in 
this ﬁeld, to inﬂuence instruments in the ﬁeld of asylum and immigration.
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5, according more freedom to the UK and Ireland to opt-in or remain outside 
with increased flexibility.84 There was much confusion domestically as to 
whether the position negotiated amounted to more of an opt-out than an opt-
out opt-in.85 It must be noted that the language surrounding the revised proce-
dures for opting-in is more conciliatory in tone than the recent decisions of the 
Court of Justice might have suggested, discussed above. Article 5(3) thereof 
encourages the “widest possible participation” of the UK and Ireland ensuring 
operability whilst “respecting coherence.”86 The new right set out in Article 5 
entails that the UK and Ireland may opt-out of measures building upon the 
Schengen acquis which they have already opted-out from. This creates a degree 
of circularity in the sense that the recent decisions of the Court of Justice only 
refused an entitlement to opt-in to building measures. And so now there is an 
express right to opt-out of building measures (subject to a strict interpretation 
of “building” because of the decision of the Court) where there was an opt-out 
from those Schengen acquis provisions that the measures sought to build upon. 
However, the prospective coherence of such an opt-out is now a legally relevant 
factor as noted above – an issue of importance in light of the decision of the 
Court and one readily inviting litigation. Notably, Article 7 now provides that 
for the purposes of negotiations for the admission of new Member States, the 
Schengen acquis and further measures taken by the institutions within its scope 
shall be regarded as an acquis which must be accepted in full by all States 
candidates for admission. Thus the Irish and UK positions must be regarded 
as peculiarly anomalous given this non-negotiability for candidate States.  
 Peers has asserted that the UK has been particularly cooperative in respect 
of the operation of the Protocol opt-in to date and also that other States have 
assisted with a smooth and non-antagonistic attitude to the operation of the 
Protocol.87 Ireland must also be interpreted as co-operating less actively and 
84. House of Lords Select Committee on European Union, cited supra note 40.
85. Smyth, op. cit. supra note 81.
86. Similar to Art. 4a of the Protocol on the position of the UK and Ireland as to the Area of 
Freedom, Security and Justice (after Lisbon) discussed infra, but without ﬁnancial penalty to the 
same extent, the latter being dealt with in a Declaration, discussed below. See House of Lords 
Select Committee on European Union, cited supra note 40, para 6.281. Declaration No. 47 pro-
vides that the UK and Ireland shall bear the direct ﬁnancial consequences, if any, necessarily and 
unavoidably incurred as a result of the cessation of their participation in some or all of the 
acquis. 
87. Peers, op. cit. supra note 51, 6, who states that inclusion rather than exclusion has been 
fostered through successful cooperation amongst those inside and outside the Protocol. Arguably 
then, this context renders the content of the revised Protocol and Declaration all the more difﬁ-
cult to assess, given the climate of antagonism and separateness that the provisions outline. Peers 
suggests that there has been no case where, after the UK or Ireland opted into a proposal, they 
blocked agreement on that proposal resulting in the other Member States going ahead without 
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less proactively, as the discussion above in section 4.2 indicates as to its 
 opting-in actions and the timing thereof to date. Wiener contended less than a 
decade ago that the British “no” to Schengen had been substantial in its 
 contribution towards forging flexibility as a constitutional principle in the 
European polity, thereby demonstrating how the Schengen process, as consti-
tutionally divisive as it might appear, has in fact contributed to further Euro-
pean integration.88 However, a decade later, if this in fact were the case, surely 
the Court would not have delivered the decisions that it did recently and the 
flexibility of the arrangements now existing would be unnecessary.89
6.3. Protocol (No. 21) on the position of the UK and Ireland as to the Area  
 of Freedom, Security and Justice
Arguably, the most significant new provision of the Treaty of Lisbon regarding 
Ireland is Protocol (No. 21) concerning the Area of Freedom, Security and 
Justice. First and foremost, it is considerably wider than any of its previous 
incarnations. There are essentially two changes made generally to this Protocol 
attached to the Treaty of Lisbon when compared with the Constitutional Treaty. 
The two changes relate firstly, to the scope of the opt-in and secondly, as to 
the repercussions of non-participation in an amending measure. The Protocol 
constitutes an opt-out from the entire Area of Freedom, Security and Justice 
and the language of Article 2 of Protocol No. 21 is particularly striking in so 
far as the opt-out position achieved is the most far-reaching of the opt-outs 
generally for the UK and Ireland and excludes the applicability of inter alia 
any decision of the Court of Justice interpreting any provision of the Area of 
Freedom, Security and Justice.90 While viewed as increased flexibility from a 
UK perspective,91 when read with the opt-ins negotiated from an Irish perspec-
tive, these provisions arguably amount to further isolation on the basis that 
Ireland will avail itself less often of the provisions than the UK, if history is 
to be judged correctly, and never proactively. The reasons commonly asserted 
for the need for such an opt-out relate firstly, to the Common Travel Area 
shared by Ireland with the UK and secondly, the common law tradition shared 
by a small minority of States within the European Union, a tradition that is 
them, suggesting that the UK Home Ofﬁce is particularly keen to avoid this ever happening, and 
that so far it has succeeded.
88. Wiener, op. cit. supra note 33. 
89. See also Protocol (No. 20) on the application of Art. 26 TFEU (ex 14 EC) to the UK and 
Ireland, which is not the subject of analysis in the main text for reasons of space.
90. Title V of Part III TFEU.
91. House of Lords Select Committee on European Union, cited supra note 40, para 6 261.
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asserted to require special treatment in this regard.92 However, neither reason 
represents an absolute barrier to change. Notably, Ireland has been asked in 
recent times to join the Schengen Area.93 The disadvantages of this position 
for Ireland are patently that it has no voice or voting rights. On the contrary, 
however, the Irish Oireachtas Joint Committee on European Affairs issued a 
statement in 2008 declaring that the opt-out opt-in position negotiated would 
ultimately protect Ireland’s legal system.94
 As for the specific terms of the Protocol, the provisions of Articles 3 and 4 
of the Protocol provide for the practical operation of the opt-in procedure, 
while Article 4a provides for penalties for the financial consequences of non-
participation, to the detriment of the States seeking to avail of constitutional 
flexibility. Notably, the Council may urge the UK or Ireland to participate 
where they are not participating, which as Peers optimistically suggests, may 
operate as an incentive to opt-in and also co-extensively give the UK and Ire-
land an opportunity to rid themselves of obligations.95 It remains plausible, 
however, that this provision could result in a serious political incident or at 
least a damaging battle against isolation, and that the UK would be more likely 
to offload obligations than Ireland. Ireland would be in great danger of seri-
ous isolation if it chose not to remain wedded to the UK in such a situation. 
Moreover, the possibility for incoherence is great, if for example, a measure 
such as the European arrest warrant is amended.96 It is not inconceivable that 
the UK or Ireland could be ejected from the European arrest warrant in the 
event of the States not participating in a building measure, with the result that 
the existing system is found inoperable by the remainder of States.97 Article 
4a is suggested to be a veritable double-edged sword, although the accuracy 
of the weaponry metaphors depends much on political will in the future. Impor-
tantly, a decision on “inoperability” would be amenable to review before the 
Court of Justice.98 Perhaps, of course, the real effect of these ambiguities will 
be limited and the uncertainties surrounding the Irish and UK (and Danish) 
positions in the field may not materialize as a result of careful political man-
agement. In neither Ireland nor the UK is there any systematic parliamentary 
92. See Donoghue and Heinl, op. cit. supra note 7.
93. See supra notes 44 and 76.
94. “Oireachtas Committee backs Lisbon Treaty” (Houses of the Oireachtas, 29 May 2008), 
see www.oireachtas.ie/viewdoc.asp?fn=/documents/press/document229.htm, (last visited 29 
Dec. 2009). 
95. See Peers, op. cit. supra note 51.
96. Id., 9.
97. And see the analysis set out in House of Lords Select Committee on European Union, 
cited supra note 40, para 6.264.
98. Id., para 6.265. 
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scrutiny of a decision to opt-in to a particular measure under this Protocol, 
although the House of Lords has recently made efforts to redress this.99 When 
viewed overall, the opt-in mechanism in the Protocol does not necessarily neu-
tralize the impact of the extensive opt-outs obtained, given the practical diffi-
culties involved in opting-in.100
 Of much importance, then, in light of the above, pursuant to Article 8 of the 
Protocol,101 Ireland may notify the Council that it no longer wishes to be cov-
ered by the terms of the Protocol. As will be explained below, then the normal 
Treaty provisions will apply to Ireland by way of parliamentary ratification 
only and not by referendum. Article 8, however, has to be construed along with 
Declaration (No. 56) annexed to the Treaty of Lisbon such that the position of 
Ireland is subject to review in three years time, i.e. in late 2012.102 This is not 
without its own complications, from the point of view of domestic constitu-
tional law, considered below.103 Hinarejos adverts to arguments made against 
the Lisbon Treaty in recent times which included assertions that it was not a 
solution to any pressing problem but rather an unnecessary step that would 
pose problems of its own.104 It is suggested here that the breadth of the Proto-
col as to Ireland and the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice is also accu-
rately captured by this comment. 
 Related to this Protocol then is a Declaration negotiated by Ireland cover-
ing the terms of its opt-out and opt-in, discussed here next. 
99. House of Lords European Union Committee, Enhanced scrutiny of EU legislation with a 
United Kingdom opt-in (2nd Report, Session 2008-09, HL Paper 25). Cf. Mance, “Opting into 
Community law and interpreting Convention rights: is the United Kingdom more or less com-
mitted?”, 3 PL (2009), 544. 
100. There are those who suggest that the enthusiasm of the UK for common action in Justice 
and Home Affairs sits oddly with the generalized opt-in/ opt-out from all newly communitarized 
areas of JHA. The incongruousness between the British positions in negotiations to the Consti-
tutional Treaty and the Treaty of Lisbon are explained on the basis of the difference in British 
governments negotiating the Treaty: Donnelly, op. cit. supra note 76. 
101.  Ireland did already have this possibility under Art. 8 of the Protocol on the position of 
the UK and Ireland of the Treaty of Amsterdam, but, as is explained below, the domestic consti-
tutional situation has now changed, and under Lisbon this option is the subject of a Declaration. 
102. The Lisbon Treaty entered into force on 1 Dec. 2009. Note that Art. 9 provides that the 
Protocol does not apply in the case of Ireland to Art. 75 TFEU. See the Twenty-Eighth Amend-
ment to the Constitution (Treaty of Lisbon) Act 2009, for the domestic provisions: see www.
oireachtas.ie.
103. Section 9 infra. 
104. Hinarejos, “The Lisbon Treaty versus standing still: A view from the Third Pillar”, 
5 EuConst (2009), 99.
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6.4. Declaration (No. 56) by Ireland annexed to the Lisbon Treaty on   
 Article 3 of the Protocol on the position of the United Kingdom and   
 Ireland in respect of the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice 
Declaration (No. 56) by Ireland, annexed to the Lisbon Treaty on Article 3 of 
the Protocol on the position of the United Kingdom and Ireland in respect of 
the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice,105 provides that:
“… Accordingly, Ireland declares its ﬁrm intention to exercise its right 
under Article 3 of the Protocol on the position of the United Kingdom and 
Ireland in respect of the area of freedom, security and justice to take part 
in the adoption of measures pursuant to Title IV of Part Three of the Treaty 
on the Functioning of the European Union to the maximum extent it deems 
possible.
Ireland will, in particular, participate to the maximum possible extent in 
measures in the ﬁeld of police cooperation.
Furthermore, Ireland recalls that in accordance with Article 8 of the Proto-
col it may notify the Council in writing that it no longer wishes to be cov-
ered by the terms of the Protocol. Ireland intends to review the operation 
of these arrangements within three years of the entry into force of the 
Treaty of Lisbon.”106
The provisions of Declaration No. 56 hence have to be construed alongside 
Article 8 of the above Protocol. Notably, the wholehearted participation of the 
Irish State in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice is expressed in the 
Declaration, notwithstanding the content of the Protocol attached to the Treaty 
of Lisbon. The temporal period set out in this Declaration is of tremendous 
importance for two specific reasons. Firstly, there is the complication that 
another referendum will not ostensibly be required as a matter of domestic 
constitutional law in three years’ time in the event that a positive decision is 
taken to participate in this corpus of law, as provision was made for this in the 
amendment to ratify the Treaty, as set out above. However, if this parliamentary 
ratification could take place in isolation without a review of the Common 
Travel Area, it remains a matter of no small importance, considered below in 
more detail given its implications. Secondly, in so far as there is a five-year 
time lag prior to the Court of Justice gaining jurisdiction over the Area of 
Freedom, Security and Justice,107 this occurs simultaneously with the 
Transitional Provisions as to the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice as to 
the UK becoming operative, discussed next, whereby the UK gains breathing 
105. CIG 3/1/07, Rev. 1. 
106. Emphasis added.
107. See the discussion here of the Protocol relating to the Transitional Provisions: section 
5(f).
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space to reconsider the implications of the ending of the five-year Transitional 
Provisions during which time the Court of Justice does not have jurisdiction. 
Thus the three-year period might more appropriately have been drafted as a 
five-year period. The UK “wait and see” provisions are, of course, politically 
explicable, but as a matter of law, lack rationality and coherence, which embod-
ies in one sense constitutional differentiation but in another, empties the sub-
stance thereof. 
 The significance of the final “Irish” provisions – i.e. Article 8 of the Proto-
col on the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice and abovementioned Decla-
ration, are far from negligible. Ireland appears to stand in a default position of 
absolute exclusion subject to a position of possible participation. The com-
bined impact of the Protocol, Declaration and Transitional Provisions (not-
withstanding that the latter do not apply as such to Ireland but ultimately will 
have some bearing on the reality of the Irish position), is a sprawling mish-
mash of inexplicable separateness and the potentiality for inclusion. While the 
possibilities for differentiation enshrined in the Treaty of Lisbon are unparal-
leled in the history of the European Union project, their impacts are unique to 
Ireland and the UK, arguably partially “going Danish,” i.e. replicating the ten-
uous Danish position to date, which itself is under review. Their peculiarity 
surely entails that there is a high likelihood that the Court will consider their 
content in the near future.108 The overall stance adopted both legally and polit-
ically by Ireland appears thus to be in the realm of the constitutional chame-
leon, as far as is optically and legally possible.109
 A related Protocol which affects the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice 
is next considered here.
6.5. Protocol (No. 36) on Transitional Provisions 
Protocol (No. 36) on Transitional Provisions attached to the Treaty of Lisbon 
sets out a temporal menu of considerable complexity which is designed to 
govern the period of time between the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon 
and the end of its extended introductory period, the duration of which is 
108. Fletcher, op. cit. supra note 8, at 97.
109. One of the most striking features of the Treaty of Lisbon must surely be the plethora of 
Protocols and Declarations attached thereto. The sheer number of Declarations annexed to the 
Final Act of the Treaty of Lisbon, at 65, adopted by either the Member States or the Inter-Gov-
ernmental Conference, is quite signiﬁcant and not since the Treaty on the European Union have 
so many detailed legal descriptors been attached to the Treaties. Clearly, Declarations often 
reﬂect matters of great national but not necessarily European interest and frequently dwell on 
veritably parochial causes that do not garner wider support. The value that the Court of Justice 
places on such instruments is less than predictable, as the decision discussed in Section 5 sug-
gests. 
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 governed by these provisions. While the provisions concerning the Area of 
Freedom, Security and Justice in the main affect the UK, Ireland is also affected 
in a significant fashion. Most notable are the provisions pertaining to the pres-
ent discussion, namely to Titles V and VI TEU prior to the entry into force of 
the Treaty of Lisbon. Articles 10(1) and (3) of the Protocol provide for a five-
year transitional period during which the Court of Justice does not enjoy juris-
diction over the newly “communitarized” Area of Freedom, Security and 
Justice nor does the Commission enjoy its powers to institute infringement 
proceedings against States during this period. Article 10(4) arguably contains 
the most striking and indulgent of all of the opt-outs conceded to the UK, 
whereby the UK is permitted six months prior to the expiry of the Transitional 
Period, to declare that it does not accept the end of the Transitional Period in 
respect of non-amended measures that have not been converted from Third 
Pillar to First Pillar status by then, an unqualified right.110 Financial penalties 
also attach pursuant to Article 10(4) for the direct financial consequences of 
cessation of its participation. The UK thus has an unprecedented right to leave 
en bloc all Third Pillar (police cooperation and judicial cooperation in criminal 
matters) acquis not meanwhile amended or replaced, which may obviously 
entail a cost to the Union given that UK withdrawal would require the measure 
to be amended. These provisions have elicited forceful reactions: “… they are 
to be deplored, for their complexity, for their potential torpedoing of ambitious 
legislative initiatives, and … for the symbolic message of the precedent: for 
the first time, an EU treaty allows a Member State to withdraw from existing 
acquis.”111
 Fletcher rightly contends that Article 10 presents a much greater danger to 
the coherence of the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice than does the Pro-
tocol on the position of the UK and Ireland as to the Area of Freedom, Secu-
rity and Justice and it is difficult to disagree.112 The rationale for the provisions 
arguably related to the desire of the British Government to avoid holding a ref-
erendum on the Treaty of Lisbon, through emphasis on the differences between 
the Constitutional Treaty and the Treaty of Lisbon.113 The provisions are thus 
110. Art. 10(5) permits the UK to participate in acts which ceased to apply to it pursuant to 
Art. 10(4). See the recommendation by the House of Lords in its report on the Treaty of Lisbon: 
House of Lords Select Committee on European Union, cited supra note 40, para 6.339: “...we 
expect that the Government will be fully engaged with the Commission and other Member 
States to ensure that measures which might prompt them to use the block opt-out are amended 
before the expiry of the transitional period.”
111. Ladenburger, “Police and Criminal law in the Treaty of Lisbon: A new dimension for the 
Community method”, 4 EuConst (2008), 20. 
112. See Fletcher, op. cit. supra note 8. 
113. See Dougan, “The Treaty of Lisbon 2007: Winning Minds, not Hearts”, 45 CML Rev. 
(2008), 617, at 683–684.
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overtly political and stretch the limits of constitutional differentiation. Impor-
tantly, the Irish State did not avail of such mechanisms and the period after the 
transition time frame could bring legal complexities of Byzantine proportions 
for Ireland. How will Ireland be affected by the “UK exclusion zone,” in the 
event that the UK does not accept “communitarization” at the end or near-end 
of the transitional period? For example, what system would be established to 
replace the European arrest warrant as between Ireland and the UK, where the 
need for a common system between the two countries has generated a vast cor-
pus of law as to extradition and now in respect of surrender under the new sys-
tem? The jurisprudence as to the European arrest warrant would become mired 
in complexity if the UK Supreme Court (which has taken over the role of the 
House of Lords), the supreme court of a common law country from which Ire-
land has traditionally drawn much of its inspiration for criminal law legisla-
tion as well as the inspiration of the legislation incorporating the ECHR, were 
to deliver judgments ordinarily persuasive but suddenly of no relevance? It 
would appear that the complexity of the provisions is detrimental both to the 
coherence of the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice in the future and poten-
tially to the interests of Ireland. 
 The above analysis completes the sectional analysis of the Irish-related Pro-
tocols and Declarations as contained in the Treaty of Lisbon. Subsequent to 
the signing of the Treaty of Lisbon, a referendum resulted in further Irish-spe-
cific legal provisions being required to be passed so as to ratify the Treaty of 
Lisbon and these events and provisions are considered here next.
7. After the signing of the Treaty of Lisbon in 2007: What happened 
next
Thus in 2008, in the first Treaty referendum, the Irish electorate rejected the 
Treaty of Lisbon for reasons adverted to earlier, shortly after a new Taoiseach 
(Prime Minister) came to power.114 A period of reflection ensued, which coin-
cided with a global economic recession, a severe downturn in the Irish economy 
as well as unprecedented unpopularity of the Irish Government. Extensive 
Government research was commissioned so as to explain the negative vote.115 
A Sub-Committee of the Houses of the Oireachtas (Parliament) was established 
on Ireland’s Future in the European Union, which then heard extensive evi-
dence from a range of experts and bodies and, it is suggested here, made a 
114. Mr Brian Cowen T.D., formerly Tánaiste, replaced Mr Bertie Ahern T.D. as Taoiseach 
in 2008. 
115. See Introduction supra.
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number of limited and generalized recommendations.116 By the time the second 
Treaty of Lisbon referendum took place, a party founded principally to oppose 
the Treaty of Lisbon, Libertas, disintegrated following an abysmal performance 
in the MEP elections in 2009.117 For the second referendum, the State’s broad-
casting rules were amended so as to facilitate the reality of the politics govern-
ing the referendum campaign, where all the major political parties supported 
the Government in their desire to procure a successful referendum result.118 
Previously, broadcasters had been obliged to provide equal airtime to those 
campaigning for and against the Treaty referendum result, despite the weight 
of elected representatives and campaigners in favour of the Treaty. This change 
was most significant in facilitating a positive referendum result. 
8. The Lisbon II guarantees provided to Ireland in 2009
As a measure to assist the Irish Government with the prospect of a second 
referendum on the Treaty of Lisbon, the concerns of the Irish people voting in 
Lisbon I were taken cognizance of in the form of Irish-specific legal guarantees 
or more formally, a Decision of the Heads of State or Government of the 27 
Member States in 2009 meeting within the European Council.119 This formula 
was adopted so as to ensure as a matter of law and for domestic political pur-
poses that the decision was a legally binding one, but also that it did not require 
the Treaty of Lisbon to be renegotiated. In this regard, the pressures brought 
to bear by the British Government were significant.120 Three specific guarantees 
were provided in total to the Irish State – a Decision, a Declaration of the 
European Council and a Declaration by the Irish State. The formula employed 
a Solemn Declaration on Workers Rights, as the British Government would 
116. Sub-Committee on Ireland’s Future in the European Union, Ireland’s future in the Euro-
pean Union: Challenges, Issues and Options (Houses of the Oireachtas, Nov. 2008). 
117. Founded by a millionaire Irish businessman Mr Declan Ganley. The party attracted con-
siderable controversy in respect of its funding.  
118. See Broadcasting Commission of Ireland, Guidelines in respect of coverage of the ref-
erendum on the Treaty of Lisbon and related Constitutional Amendments 2009 (2009), see www.
bci.ie. 
119. See Presidency Conclusions of the Brussels European Council, (18–19 June 2009) 
(11225/2/09, Rev. 2, 10 July 2009), which expresses that the Decision in Annex I is a legal guar-
antee that is fully compatible with the Treaty of Lisbon and is legally binding: (a) Decision of the 
Heads of State or Government of the 27 Member States of the European Union, meeting within 
the European Council, on the concerns of the Irish people on the Treaty of Lisbon (Annex 1); (b) 
Solemn Declaration on Workers’ Rights, Social Policy and other issues (Annex 2). Cf. Ediorial 
comment, “Protocology”, 46 CML Rev. 1785 et seq. 
120. See the account of Miller, “The Treaty of Lisbon after the Second Irish Referendum” 
(House of Commons Research Paper 09/75, 8 Oct. 2009), Ch. 6.
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not allow the Government to obtain a Protocol referencing workers rights, for 
fear that they would be interpreted as obtaining a less effective deal for their 
electorate.121 The concerns addressed by the guarantees include the right to 
life, family, education, taxation, security and defence and the subjects (in all 
except education) reflect the findings of the Government commissioned 
researched in to the negative first Treaty of Lisbon vote in 2008.122 The formula 
set out in the guarantees, as to the various subjects and their expressed com-
patibility as a matter of Irish constitutional law with the provisions of the Treaty 
of Lisbon, retains a solidly domestic flavour to it, reflecting the genesis of the 
Treaty of Lisbon I campaign, where serious fears were publicly raised by 
influential members of society as to the likelihood of the detention of three-
year-olds pursuant to the provisions of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, 
despite the groundlessness of these claims.123
 The Decision taken in 2009 by the Heads of State or Government expresses 
itself to be legally binding in a particularly explicitly fashion.124 The formula 
is also expressed to be subject to a promise or expectation, as a matter of law, 
that the decision will become a Protocol to the Treaties at the next Accession 
Treaty. The necessity of a dual reference to it being a legally binding decision 
and a prospective Protocol has been openly questioned by the British Govern-
ment.125 Peers has suggested that there is no conflict between the Decision and 
the Treaties, and most commentators assert a similar position or in fact that 
the guarantees substantially ameliorate existing domestic constitutional pro-
tections.126 So as to stall the successful ratification of the Treaty of Lisbon, a 
suggestion was made that the Czech Republic could be denied a Commissioner 
in the next Commission on account of the legal position currently subsisting 
as to the composition of the Commission.127 Otherwise, the guarantees although 
121. Ibid.
122. Post-Lisbon Treaty Research Findings (Dublin, Millward Brown IMS, Sept. 2008), 
www.imsl.ie/ (last visited 27 Nov. 2009).
123. Hogan, op. cit. supra note 2. 
124. See the Editorial comments, 46 CML Rev. (2009), 1383, at 1385–1387.
125. Miller, op. cit. supra note 119, at 26. 
126. Peers, Statewatch Lisbon Treaty Guarantees for Ireland 2009 (19 June 2009), see www.
statewatch.org; Hogan, “Irish protocol will copper-fasten right to life of the unborn”, Irish 
Times, 18 Sept. 2009. 
127. Topolánek, a former Czech Prime Minister, warned that the Czech Republic would 
lose its European commissioner if it was responsible for delaying the entry into force of the 
Treaty of Lisbon. Speaking after a meeting with Commission President Barroso, Topolánek 
said that the European Parliament would reject a Czech candidate for commissioner even if 
the government vetoed an attempt in the European Council to deny the Czechs a place in the 
Commission: (Renewed Czech threat to Lisbon Treaty ratiﬁcation European Voice (1 Oct. 2009) 
www.europeanvoice.com/article/imported/renewed-czech-threat-to-lisbon-treaty-ratiﬁcation/
65987.aspx.
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influenced to a degree by Irish-British relations, do not appear to have been 
significantly affected by these relations. Clearly, the guarantees had to relate 
to Irish-specific interests. Notably, the research did not suggest broader con-
cerns or issues relating to the Common Travel Area, the Schengen Area Pro-
tocol or the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice.
 In light of the above analysis as a matter of European Union law as to Irish 
specific instruments used to ratify the Treaty of Lisbon, an account of the 
domestic constitutional provisions of relevance to ratification follows for com-
pleteness’ sake. 
9. Domestic constitutional provisions passed so as to ratify the Treaty 
of Lisbon
The Twenty-Eighth Amendment to the Constitution (Treaty of Lisbon) Act, 
2009 was enacted to amend domestic constitutional provisions relating to 
European Union affairs and thus ratify the Treaty of Lisbon.128 The key amend-
ments are made to the existing provisions of Article 29 of the Constitution 
dealing with European Union affairs and the subject of amendment with each 
Treaty, to paragraph 4 thereof. A fuller analysis of these provisions is outside 
the scope of this work, and one provision is selected here for examination. 
9.1. Parliamentary approval and opt-ing in
Of the recent constitutional changes, the revised Article 29.4.7° permits the 
State, with only the approval of Parliament needed and not a referendum, to 
engage in enhanced cooperation and to take part in the Schengen Area and the 
Area of Freedom, Security and Justice. This permission – considered below 
– is the constitutional background to the Protocol on the Area of Freedom, 
Security and Justice (No. 21). Article 29.4.7° provides that: 
“7° The State may exercise the options or discretions —
i to which Article 20 of the Treaty on European Union relating to enhanced 
cooperation applies, 
ii under Protocol No. 19 on the Schengen acquis integrated into the frame-
work of the European Union annexed to that treaty and to the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union (formerly known as the Treaty estab-
lishing the European Community), and
iii under Protocol No. 21 on the position of the United Kingdom and Ire-
land in respect of the area of freedom, security and justice, so annexed, 
128. As to the relevant existing provisions, see Hogan and Whyte, op. cit. supra note 9, para 
5.4.35 et seq. 
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including the option that the said Protocol No. 21 shall, in whole or in part, 
cease to apply to the State, but any such exercise shall be subject to the 
prior approval of both Houses of the Oireachtas.”
Mere parliamentary approval is then needed to opt in pursuant to Article 8 of 
the Protocol, as a matter of domestic law.129 This falls short of a possibly more 
rigorous and systematic approach, such as that being contemplated in the UK 
at the time of writing.130 The European Union Act 2009, which amends Irish 
statutory law to incorporate the enhanced role for national parliaments as to 
the new Protocol on subsidiarity as contained in the Treaty of Lisbon, is equally 
devoid of any system to deal with the implications of Article 4a noted above 
(financial implications of non-participation) or the remainder of the Protocol.131 
This type of “advance parliamentary approval” has its origins in Ireland in the 
constitutional amendments passed to deal with the variable geometry provi-
sions of the Treaty of Amsterdam, in Article 29 of the Constitution also.132 This 
represented, domestically at least, an important development and a more effec-
tive (and cost effective) means of dealing with the complexities of European 
Law developments, arguably more so than a referendum.
 It could be contended that the constitutional amendments made recently 
authorizing the State, by way of parliamentary authority only, to elect to opt 
into the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, pursuant to the terms of the 
relevant Protocol or to join the Schengen Area, are unduly straightforward or 
simplistic. The difficulty with the simplicity of the constitutional provision 
drafted is that is fails to enumerate other related issues arising in the event of 
the State exercising such choices. For example, the three-year review set out 
in Declaration (No. 56), considered above, would take place ahead of the five-
year transition period to accept the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice and the 
five-year lead-in period for the UK to accept communitarized Third Pillar acts. 
The Irish Government could of course, for political reasons, in three years time 
elect to have a referendum for Ireland to opt-in or not to the Area of Freedom, 
Security and Justice or the Schengen acquis, but arguably it would not have 
to hold such a referendum as the strict wording of the constitutional  amendment 
129. Twenty-Eighth Amendment to the Constitution (Treaty of Lisbon) Act 2009: see www.
oireachtas.ie.
130. See House of Lords European Union Committee, Enhanced scrutiny of EU legislation 
with a United Kingdom opt-in (2nd Report, Session 2008-09, HL Paper 25). 
131. Practice suggests that Irish MEPs do not vote in the plenary where Ireland has not opted 
into a measure: see generally House of Lords Select Committee on European Union, cited supra 
note 40. This, arguably, is a worrisome development in the long term, particularly if Ireland 
reviews its opt-out in the future, as per the terms of Declaration (No. 56) considered above. 
132. See formerly Arts. 29.4.6 and 29.4.8, the Eighteenth and Twenty-Sixth Amendments to 
the Constitution respectively.
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passed does not provide for this; on the contrary, simple parliamentary approval 
is required. The timing thereof appears temporally ill-judged in light of the 
ramifications for Ireland of the UK exercising opt-out rights after the five-year 
period. 
9.2. Opting-in: Constitutional difﬁculties?
It is submitted here that the Common Travel Area would need to be reviewed 
in the event of Ireland electing to opt-in to the Schengen Agreement pursuant 
to the terms of Article 29.4.7° and Protocol No. 21. Ostensibly, of course, no 
domestic constitutional law issue arises, as the Common Travel Area has its 
basis originally in administrative measures and not in the Constitution.133 Only 
in 1997 did the Common Travel Area receive mention as a matter of European 
Union law, pursuant to the Amsterdam Protocols on Schengen and Article 14 
EC. It could be asserted that the removal of the Common Travel Area would 
result in a loss of national sovereignty warranting a referendum within the 
meaning of existing Supreme Court jurisprudence governing European Union 
law affairs,134 on account of the provisions of the Constitution modified after 
the Good Friday Agreement according citizenship to those born on the Island 
of Ireland and the assertions of unity of the people North and South of the 
Island.135 The Common Travel Area is a privilege, but its removal could 
adversely impact on the free movement rights of citizens of Northern Ireland 
electing to obtain Irish citizenship. Arguably, a more concrete legal basis would 
need to be ring-fenced as to British-Irish relations given the terms of the Irish 
Constitution if the Common Travel Area were amended. 
133. See supra, section 3. 
134. The Supreme Court decision in Crotty v. An Taoiseach, [1987] I.R. 713 has entailed that 
a referendum on European Treaty ratiﬁcation has been held consistently since that decision, 
which decided that a Treaty had to be submitted by referendum to the people where a proposed 
Treaty altered the scope and objectives of the Union such that the initial popular consent to Euro-
pean Union membership had been exceeded.
135. See Arts. 2, 3 and 9 of the Irish Constitution. Art. 9 now provides that: 
“1. 1° On the coming into operation of this Constitution any person who was a citizen of 
Saorstát Éireann immediately before the coming into operation of this Constitution shall become 
and be a citizen of Ireland. 
2° The future acquisition and loss of Irish nationality and citizenship shall be determined in 
accordance with law…
2. 1° Notwithstanding any other provision of this Constitution, a person born in the island of 
Ireland, which includes its islands and seas, who does not have, at the time of the birth of that 
person, at least one parent who is an Irish citizen or entitled to be an Irish citizen is not entitled 
to Irish citizenship or nationality, unless provided for by law. 
2° This section shall not apply to persons born before the date of the enactment of this sec-
tion…”  
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 In sum, the amendments made to the Irish Constitution are in the main min-
imalist. However, the opt-in provisions raise several issues of immense com-
plexity and the efforts made to simplify the position of the State may not be 
so easily realized, given the range of variables surrounding those choices to 
be exercised by other actors.
10. Conclusion
Ireland is politically not at the heart of European affairs, although the Irish 
State does not attract the same “Euro-sceptic” labels as its closest neighbour. 
There remains a complex interaction between the Irish and British States in 
matters of law and politics. The Common Travel Area is historically the legal 
and political basis for Irish-European policy positions as to the Schengen Area 
and the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice. However, the Common Travel 
Area reflects the deep-seated complexities of the entity that is the “Irish-
British-European” relationship. Water borders are only a minimal element of 
the factual matrix of these relations and yet in many accounts they appear as 
the most critical one. The extent to which the Court of Justice in its two deci-
sions in 2007 upset the purpose of the Schengen Protocol special arrangements 
is most remarkable, but ultimately did not deter Ireland and the UK from 
extending further the limits of constitutional differentiation in the Treaty of 
Lisbon. The Schengen Protocol “special arrangements” for the UK and Ireland 
have not been well received by commentators or the Court of Justice, serving 
often to show their futility. The breadth of the recent opt-outs obtained by 
Ireland seems difficult to understand given the separateness that they encour-
age and is explicable only to the extent that they support a commonality of 
“Irish-British-European” relations. It has been argued here that increased con-
stitutional flexibility accorded to Ireland and the UK in the Treaty of Lisbon 
appears legally disproportionate to its effectiveness as a matter of EU law. 
Major complexities surround the operation of Declaration (No. 56) and the 
Protocols and the simplicity of the relevant domestic constitutional law provi-
sions remains problematic, as does the absence of mention of the Common 
Travel Area in Irish constitutional law. Notably the research conducted to 
investigate the negative Lisbon referendum result in Ireland did not uncover 
any sentiments as to “Irish-British-European” relations. 
 It might take an especially brave Court of Justice to overlook or defy the 
peculiarities of the Protocols and Declarations negotiated by Ireland (and the 
UK) in the Treaty of Lisbon. Far from the claims of Wiener over a decade ago 
that differentiated State behaviour and opt-outs gave rise to an effective prin-
ciple of constitutional differentiation, the reality instead is a bleak mismatch 
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of incoherence. Curtin’s “Europe of bits and pieces”136 perhaps has been rem-
edied to a degree, Treaty by Treaty and with patchily significant interventions 
on the part of the Court of Justice. However, the “bits and pieces” of the Irish-
specific opt-outs have increased in scale and in direction. The matrix compris-
ing European Union law, national law, the Protocols and Declarations and the 
complex beast of “Irish-British-European” relations, conjointly has yet to 
receive any consideration by the Court of Justice. Its incoherence and com-
plexity may not be fully “ECJ proofed” but equally nor is it ever likely to be 
so.
136. Curtin, “The constitutional structure of the Union: A Europe of bits and pieces”, 
30 CML Rev. (1993), 17. 
